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In the SupreiDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
HOTEL UTAH COiliPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
Petiti.oner, 
vs. 
R. H. DALR.YMPLE, OTTO WEIS-
LEY and H. FRED EGAN constitut-
ing the Utah Labor Relations Board, 
and LAUNDRY WORKERS LOCAL 
UNION NO. 316, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7290 
BRIEF IN BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT 
The Utah Labor Relations Board certified the 
Laundry Workers Local Union No. 316 the collective 
bargaining agent for all of petitioner's employees in its 
laundry unit. Thereafter the petitioner ignored such 
certification, and refused to bargain; whereupon unfair 
labor practices were charged against petitioner. The 
Board, after hearing such charges, thereupon formally 
ordered petitioner to bargain; petitioner again ignored 
the Board and sued for a writ of review in this Court. 
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At the outset we desire to expressly invite the 
Court's attention to an odd situation in a labor contro-
versy. There were at least thirty-five laundry employees 
of Petitioner involved in this matter, in addition to its 
executive and supervisory personnel. The case was pro-
longed over quite a period of time, and divided into three 
separate hearings, viz., June 24, 1948, July 12, 1948, and 
December 6th, 1948. Yet not a single witness was called 
to the witness stand by Petitioner, except Louis H. Cal-
lister (attorney for Petitioner), and he quite naturally 
and obviously put into the record the precipate of Peti-
tioner's bitter opposition to the Board's decision in this 
matter. Mr. Callister testified (Tr. 16, Dec. 6 hearing 
1948), as follows: 
MR. CALLISTER: No, we weren't crossed up 
at all. As I told you heretofore, there were two 
reasons why we would not bargain. The first 
is that the unit was not the appropriate unit for 
the purpose of collective bargaining because it 
was contrary to the laws and practices of the 
industry particularly of the lloltd Utah Com-
pany; and second, that the employees were de-
prived of their right to indicate their desire by 
secret ballot." (Emphasis ours.) 
Thus it appears that the Petitioner is intent on 
pre-empting the Board in a determination of which em-
ployees shall constitute a collective bargaining unit, thus 
ignoring the welfare of its employes and in violation of 
the statute, which says the Board shall decide in eacl1 
case in order to insure the employees full benefits of 
self organization, etc. (Sub-section (b) of Section 49-1-17 
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of the .\rt.) Thus they upset craft unionism; furthermore, 
Petitioner ~ti·ive~ to substitute its judgn1ent in place of 
the Board's judgment in selecting the appropriate man-
ner of ascertaining what rollective bargaining agent, if 
any, Petitioner's laundry employees have chosen. 
It would seem perfectly obvious that, if there was 
even a little doubt respecting whom Petitioner's laundry 
employees desired to represent them, or the manner in 
which such employees desired to make their wishes 
known, the Petitioner would have had at least some of 
its en1ployees testify at the hearing. And on the other 
hand, even if there was a little doubt that the usual 
craft unit ''Tas inappropriate to the operations of Peti-
tioner's hotel, then certainly, in that event, Petitioner 
would have called one of its executives to the witness 
stand and placed at least some evidence in the record 
touching the merits of a contention it so long and vigor-
ous!~' proclaims. 
We shall treat Petitioner's assignments of error in 
the order in which they appear in its brief. 
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO.1 
"The order of the Utah Labor Relations 
Board, dated the 27th day of January, 1949, is 
void in that it is not supported by any Findings 
of Fact, as provided for in Title 49-1-18, Sub-
section C, Utah Code Annotated 1943." 
In the unfair labor practices procedure in this mat-
ter the union filed charges before the Board alleging 1, 
that the Utah Hotel Company is engaged in the general 
hotel business in Salt Lake City, and has engaged in and 
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is engaging in unfair labor practices. 2, that the union 
is now and ever since August 5, 1948 has been and is 
-the duly authorized collective bargaining representative 
of respondents employees in a collective bargaining unit 
appropriate for the purposes of bargaining with em-
ployer respecting hours, wages and conditions of employ-
ment. 3, that the Utah Hotel Company has deliberately 
and wilfully refused to bargain with the union and that 
on several occasions the union has endeavored to bargain 
with the Utah Hotel Company in such behalf, but that 
the company continued to refuse or recognize the union 
as the bargaining agent of its laundry employees. 4, that 
the company has interfered and restrained its employees 
in their rights guaranteed in Section 49-1-15 of Utah 
Labor Relations Act. 5, that the Company has dominated 
and interfered with the affairs of the union. 6, that 
the Company has discriminated against certain of its 
laundry employees. 7, that su-ch unfa.ir labor practices 
on the pa.rt of the Company ~are wnfai.r labor practices 
affectin.g int11astate commerce and the orderly opera-
tion of bus-iness within the mea;ning of the Utah Labor 
Relations Act. 
The union therefor prayed the board to issue its 
complaint in the premises. On the 16th day of N ovem-
ber, 1948, the board issued its complaint stating: 1. That 
the Company is a corporation of the State of Utah and 
does business in Salt Lake City. 2. That the Company 
is an employer within the meaning of the Utah Labor 
Relations Act. 3. That the union is a labor organization 
within the meaning of said Act. 4. That respondent has re-
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fused to bargain collertiYely with the union in violation 
of the Board's certification of August 5, 1948, and in 
violation of the Art. 
The answer of the Company admits paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the complaint and admits that it has refused 
to bargain with the union, and as an affirmative de-
fense, sets out in its answer that the union is not the 
authorized bargaining representative of the Company's 
employees in the laundry unit, and that the unit found 
by the Board is not an appropriate unit, and that the 
method of selecting the bargaining unit on behalf of 
the Company's laundry employees as found by the Board 
was wrong. 
The hearing to determine the issues respecting the 
unfair labor charges was held pursuant to notice of 
the Board on the 6th day of December, 1948, such hear-
ing was conducted by the Honorable Daniel Edwards, 
a Commissioner of the Utah Labor Relations Board, 
who presided at the hearing. Commissioner Edwards, 
who conducted the hearing, made and entered the fol-
lowing findings of faet: 
1. That Hotel Utah Company, hereinafter 
referred to as Respondent, is a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of the State of Utah and 
as such is doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. That Respondent is an employer within 
the meaning of Title 49-1-10, Sub-section (2), 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended. 
3. That Laundry Workers Local Union No. 
316, hereinafter referred to as Complainant, is 
a labor organization within the meaning of Title 
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49-1-10, sub-section (5), as amended. 
4. That a· hearing was held before the Hon-
orable Daniel Edwards on June 24, 1948, on a 
Petition for Investigation and Certification of 
Representatives in the matter of case No. 615. 
5. That the Utah Labor Relations Board 
found that an appropriate collective bargaining 
unit consisted as follows: 
All laundry production workers and ex-
clude clerical workers and supervisors 
with power to hire and fire. 
6. That the Utah Labor Relations Board 
certified the Petitioner as the lega:lly selected and 
designated agent of the employees of Respondent 
in the above described unit for the purpose of 
eollctive bargaining on August 5, 1948. 
7. That Complainant and Rspondent did 
meet on several occasions but did not enter into 
collective bargaining. 
8. That Respondent did refuse to bargain 
with Complainant on the grounds: (a) That the 
unit found by the Board was not an appropriate 
unit. (b) That the Board's method of determin-
ing the collective bargaining representative, if 
any, was not in conformity with the Utah Labor 
Relations Act. 
9. That Respondent did refuse to bargain. 
Thereafter, on the 27th day of J amiary 1949, the 
Utah Labor Relations Board acting through Commission-
ers Daniel Edwards, H. Fred Egan, and R. H. Dalrymple 
concurred in Commissioner Edwards findings of fact and 
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conclusions, that is to say, agreed to and adopted such 
findings of fact and conclusions and issued its order re-
quiring the Company ( 1) to cease and desist from any 
further Unfair Labor Practices, (2) to enter into col-
lective bargaining with the union, ( 3) and notify the 
Board of compliance on the part of the Company, with 
the Board's order. 
Petitioner protests that there are no legal findings 
of fact in this case. Let us examine this issue; Sub-
section (c) of Section -1:9-1-18 of the Utah Labor Rela-
tions Act, reads as follows: 
. . . ''Thereafter in its discretion, the board, 
upon notice, may take further testimony or hear 
argument. If upon all the testimony taken the 
board shall he of the opinion that any person 
named in the complaint has engaged in or is 
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then 
the hoard shall state its findings of fact and shall 
issue and cause to he served on such person an 
order to cease and desist from such unfair labor 
practice, and to take such affirmative action, in-
cluding reinstatement of employees with or with-
out back pay as will ffectuate the policies of this 
act. Such order may further require such person 
to make reports from time to time showing the 
extent to which it has complied with the order. 
If upon all the testimony taken the board shall 
be of the opinion that no person named in the 
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any 
such unfair labor practice, then the board shall 
state its findings of fact and shall issue an order 
dismissing the said complaint.'' 
There can be no doubt that full, separately stated 
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and comprehensive findings of fact were made by Com-
missioner Edwards. Nor can there be any doubt that 
such findings of fact are agreed to and concurrd in by 
the other two commissioners. (See order of the Board 
January 27, 1949.) 
It is far fetched and remote for petitioner to 
contend that the Board should adopt any particular 
method of stating the findings of fact with any sort of 
meticulous exactitude, for the reason that, all that is 
contemplated by the section of the statute above referred 
to, is that the Board state its findings of fact, issue its 
order to cease and desist, and t1ake affirmat,ive act~on. 
The manner, method, form, and fashion in which, or 
time when the Board shall state its findings of fact is 
not mentioned by the statute. Indeed the board in this 
respect has a very wide latitude and discretion under 
the statute. See Teamsters Local Union No. 22·2 and 
the Industrial Commission vs. Strevell Patterson Hard-
ware Co., 17 4 P2d 164, in which case the court says: 
"Section 49-1-18 U.C.A. 1943 required the 
Board to make findings of fact after testimony 
taken on complaint that any person has engaged 
in unfair 'labor practices. It does not provide for 
any particular type of findings of fact, and it is 
our opinion that in the absence of such instruc-
tion from the legislature, findings of fact which 
would be sufficient to sustain a judgment or order 
of a court will be sufficient to sustain an order 
of the Board.'' 
If findings of fact are stated, the above section of 
the Act is complied with. The Act doesn't even require 
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the Board to state its findings of fact in writing. The 
testimony in the case 1nust be reduced to writing, but 
there is no such provision of the section prescribing 
such reduction respecting the Boards findings of fact, 
hence if the board decides that it wants to adopt the 
findings of fact of its own member, made pursuant to its 
own hearing, that is certainly within the discretion of 
the board. If a board member has made, in the case, 
full and con1plete itemized findings of fact, which meets 
the approval of and are concurred and adopted by the 
whole Board, why should the Board be put to the extra 
burden of making findings of fact all over again-that 
would seem to be nonsen~e. 
The board, under this section of the statute, had 
the obvious right to adopt and concur in the findings 
of fact of its own member. Indeed all that can be 
said respecting any insufficiency of findings of fact, is 
that the findings as originally found were found by a 
minority and adopted by a majority of the Board; cer-
tainly when the findings of fact were ultimately con-
curred in by all of the board members, then such find-
ings of fact become the legal, binding, unanimous findings 
of fact by the Board. 
PETITIONER'S ASSIGN~fENT OF ERROR NO. 2 
The Board erred in directing a cross-check of the 
Company's payroll as the suitable method to ascertain 
the representative of a majority of the employees. 
Sub-section (c) of Section 49-1-17 reads as follows: 
"Whenever a question affecting intrastate 
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commerce or the orderly operation of industry 
arises concerning the representation of employ-
ees, the board may investigate such controversy 
and certify to the parties, in writing, the name 
or names of the representatives that have been 
designated or selected. In any such investigation, 
the hoard shall provide for an appropriate hear-
ing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a 
proceeding under Section 11 ( 18) or otherwise, 
and may take a secret ballot of employees, or uti-
lize any other suitable method to ascertailn such 
y,epresent~atives. (Emphasis ours.) 
It readily appears from the language employed in 
the above section; that if the Board decides to make an 
investigation in a representation case, then and in that 
event, the Board must provide for a hearing and that 
is the only must; the hearing shall, of course, be upon 
due notice and appropriate. Now the hearing can be 
in conjunction with an unfair labor practice charge or 
it can be otherwise. No provision is contained in the 
section providing for an election. Indeed the legislature 
has given wide discretion to the Board to determine how 
and by what method a collective bargaining agent shall 
be designated. Indeed the Board can use any method 
suitable to ascertain such designation. It may take a 
secret ballot, but this is only a suggestion on the part 
of the legislature. The emphasis is on the discretion of 
the Board to use any suitable method. Assume that the 
Board would decide, that here the suitable method to 
designate the representative among the employees, would 
be by a ballot, there is absolutely nothing in the section that 
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even squints at when the ballot shall be cast. For all 
that appears, the ballot can be held before the investiga-
tion. or after the inYestigation, or during the investiga-
tion, or before, after or during the hearing. Indeed the 
discretion of the Board pursuant to this section seems 
to be Yery wide and general. The Board is not required 
to investigate. The only thing it must ·ao, if it de-
cides to investigate, is hold a hearing and when the 
hearing is to be held is not mentioned. We therefore sub-
mit, in this case the Board did investigate, the Board did 
hold a hearing, and the Board did certify in writing the 
collective bargaining agent, which was the union, that 
had been designated. 
Now if the Board knew, as it surely did, that a 
collectiYe bargaining representative had already been 
designated by the laundry employees, and in writing, 
over the solemn signatures of the respective employees, 
composing the unit, then why resort to the extra time, 
ceremony and procedure of affixing a cross to still 
another designation exhibit. And it is important, if the 
Court please, to keep in mind in this behalf, that there 
was not here presented an intramural scrap between 
two or more labor unions, contending for a bargaining 
representative. There was only one single labor union 
involved; so it was merely a question of no union or the 
Laundry Workers Union. This situation made it rela-
tively easy for the Board to determine whether or not 
the laundry employees wanted to be unionized; and fur-
thermore, the testimony shows approximately 35 em-
ployees comprised the laundry unit (Tr. 6, June 24th 
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hearing) of the Hotel Utah; that 70% of the employees 
composing the laundry unit were represented by the 
union (Tr. 30, June 24th hearing). Mr. Harter, the In-
ternational Representative, testified when questioned by 
Mr. Callister: (Tr. 30, June 24th hearing) 
BY MR. CALLISTER: 
Q. Now Mr. Harter, it was at this meeting last 
night when individuals were present whose 
names appear on Petitioner's Proposed Ex-
hibit 1, at that time did you tell them that 
by signing that authorization that they would 
strengthen the case so there would be no 
election~ 
A. No, I didn't think we would have to have an 
election anyway, with 100%. 
Now what persuaded the Board to order a cross-
check, which is the common method in this t~pe of case, 
where all the union testimony and exhibits are thrown 
open to invite examination and cross-examination by the 
adversary, of course we do not know. The history of 
collective bargaining negotiations, for one thing, on the 
part of an employer is very important. References were 
made on page 14 of the June 24th transcript to another 
Hotel Utah Company case, which was heard before the 
Utah Labor Relations Board, and apparently it was a 
long and notorious proceeding (Tr. 15, June 24th hear-
ing). Apparently the union in that case had a big ma-
jority of the employees of the Hotel Utah, and then the 
Hotel Utah clamored for an election, precisely as they 
are doing here, in the same words and by the same rea-
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soning, and an election was ordered and the union lost 
that election by one vote (Tr. 18, July 12th hearing). 
On the other hand, there was apparently an election 
lately held in another case between Hotel Utah and an-
other union, and the employees voted in favor of the 
union 39 to 1 ( Tr. 18, July 12th hearing), so the election 
issue on the part of the company can't be very sincere. 
That the Board does a good conscientious, honest 
and impartial job of administrating the Act and its duties 
and obligations, there would seem to be no doubt. (Tr. 
16, July 12th hearing.) 
"~IR. CALLISTER: I am sure if that had been 
the case, his report would indicate that. This 
Board has the machinery to see to it that it is 
done without any interference. Now this Board, 
Mr. Beck, as you know, conducts an election as 
unbiased and expeditious as I have ever seen. 
As a matter of fact, it does a better job, in my 
opinion, than the National Labor Relations Board, 
and I have seen them both in operation, and I 
have never had a complaint on this Board con-
ducting an election. They have been cooperating 
with the employer as well as the Union-! could-
n't criticize them at all. I feel that accusation 
is offensive and improper. When this Board con-
ducts an election, it does it right, or it doesn't 
conduct it. I have seen that, and you rnay rest 
assured if this Board orders an election, it will be 
conducted right because Mr. Gehring and Mr. 
Cockayne, or whoever conducts the elections are 
above reproach, and they would never tolerate 
interference by Management or the Union at all." 
Thus, when management discharges an obligation, 
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the report is generally loud in all directions-however, 
if our adversary is so thoroughly sold on the honesty, 
integrity and good faith of the Board, why does it so 
bitterly oppose the Board in the exercise of the discre-
tion the statute so plainly and palpably delegates to the 
Board-unless the Company desires to gain a selfish 
unilateral advantage it is not entitled to. 
Why should the Board be put to the extra expense, 
time and trouble of requiring the company's laundry 
employees for a third successive time to express their 
preference for a bargaining representative. First, a 
very wide majority, in writing over the solemn signa-
tures of the respective laundry employees, designated 
the union as their bargaining representative, see Exhibit 
A, and again, later, for the second time, these same 
employees reiterated their preference, and in writing 
too, over their respective signatures, in authorizing, con-
stituting and appointing the union their bargaining 
representatve, see Exhibit 1. 
That the Board investigated the matter there is no 
doubt, hence presumptively, the Board knew and knows 
the facts, from direct contact and direct examination 
of the laundry employees. Why does the Company chal-
lenge the Board, in the presence of the statute that so 
expressly provides for this identical procedure. The 
statute suggests the Board may hold an election, but the 
statute goes further and emphasises the fact that the 
Board may exercise other procedure to effectuate the 
policy of the Act. The Board knows the history of col-
lective bargaining on the part of the Company, from its 
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own files. and knows the history of this case. This his-
tory, if the court please, is of paramount, substantial and 
great relative hnportance in a labor controversy. The 
record discloses that the Company quite deliberately and 
most C-onspicuously neither produced nor attempted to 
introduce any testimony or any exhibits from its files 
or otherwi~e, with the excepting of, Mr. Callister. 
~ otwithstanding, the Company had abundant access, 
contact. and dominion over its own employees, its own 
executive officers, and its own records and files. When 
such testimony and such evidence is so easily and readily 
available to the Company and under its control and do-
minion as it is here, the presumption, certainly is-that if 
the Company had produced one single employee or one 
executive or any of its files, those employees, those execu-
tives, and those files would have been detrimental to the 
Company and in favor of the Union. Why was the Com-
pany so silent, and so inactive in the production of evi-
dence to assist the Board in a determination of the issue, 
and why does it protest with such abundant vigor the 
Board's decision. There must be a very good reason in 
its general strategy-there usually is-the answer might 
be procrastination. When everything else fails, procrast-
ination will beat the unions down and break their backs, 
because of the turnover in payroll, the waiting out, the dis-
appointments, anxiety, instability and the daily uncer-
tainty of the employment status and the final result. All of 
these element~ work to the huge advantage of the employer 
and express themselves in the maxim-'' justice delayed is 
justice defeated.'' So procrastination Inay be the reason 
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for the extra hearing and continuance in this case. The 
Company deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the Board's 
orders, and incidently it thus gained another delay with 
an appeal to this Court. 
Petitioner seems to emphasize and rely on the N a-
tional Labor Relations Board holding in the Cudahy 
case. The facts in the Cudahy case were entirely differ-
ent than in the case at bar. In the Cudahy case, two 
contending separate unions were campaigning for the 
same collective bargaining certificate, so for a most ex-
cellent reason the Board decided, to ·effectuate the 
policies of the Act, the best way to quiet the strife 
existing between the two contending unions was to call 
all of the employees into an election and have them 
mark a ballot deciding which contending union, they 
wanted to serve them as a collective bargaining agent. 
In the case at bar, there was only one union involved, 
and practically all of the company's employees, had at 
two different occasions, expressed their preference in 
writing for the Laundry Workers Union. Indeed, no 
other union appeared that could assume such jurisdic-
tion. In the matter of A. Sartorius and Co., Inc., and 
United Mines Workers of America Dfs-trict No. 50, Local 
No. 12090, 40 N.L.R.B. 107, decided April 3, 1942, the 
National Labor Relations Board cites the Cudahy case 
and then holds : 
"The respondent's contention, that it should 
not be required to bargain with the Union in the 
absence of an election by secret ballot in view 
of the alleged doubts concerning the Union's 
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majority i:::; silnilarly without merit. 
'• "\V e find that on and at all times after June 
2-!, 1938, the lTnion was the duly designated repre-
sentative of the Inajority of the e1nployees in the 
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bar-
gaining, and, pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the 
_._-\._ct, was the exclusive representative of all the 
employees in such unit for purposes of collective 
bargaining.'· 
Respecting the proposition generally and the dis-
position of the National Labor Relations Board par-
ticularly we cite the following cases: 
Consolidated .Jfachine Tool Corporation and 
Pattern :Makers League of North America, 67 
N.L.R.B. 7-!7 April 25, 1946, in which the board 
said: 
"We concur in the Trial Examiner's conclu-
sion that the League was on January 16, 1945, 
and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive 
bargaining representative of the employees with-
in the appropriate unit. In excepting to this 
conclusion, the respondent does not challenge the 
Trial Examiner's findings that a majority of the 
employees within the appropriate unit had signed 
the League's membership application cards by 
January 16, 1945, and the 'Candidate's Applica-
tions' on March 27, 1945. The respondent con-
tends, however, that the signing of such cards 
did not constitute designation of the League as 
bargaining representatives on the grounds, in 
substance, that the cards contained no express 
designation of the League as bargaining agent; 
that the pattern makers never became members 
of the League, nor did they pay their entire initi-
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ation fee to the League; that certain of the pat-
tern makers testified at the hearing that they 
signed the cards for the purpose of being excluded 
from the bargaining unit which the machinists 
sought to represent and did not desire representa-
tion by the League ; and that the signing and 
delivery of the cards by the employees was con-
ditional. 
''Like the Trial Examiner, we find no merit 
in the respondent's contention. As the Trial Ex-
aminer states, an application for membership 
implies authority to bargain; neither membership 
in, nor payment of dues to a union is determin-
ative of statutory authorization. And we agree 
with the Trial Examiner that the testimony of a 
signor as to his subjective state of mind at the 
time of signing cannot operate to overcome the 
effect of his overt action in having signed the 
application card. '' 
National Labor Relations Board vs. Chicago 
Apparatus Company, CCA 7, 116 Fed. 2d 753, 
December 12, 1940: 
"Application for membership may be counted 
in determining whether the union has a majority. 
National Labor Relations Board vs. Somerset 
Shoe Co., 111 Fed 2d 681; National Labor Rela-
tions Board vs. Bradford Dyeing Association, 
310 U. S. 318. This is true even though no dues 
have been paid." 
In th case of Lebanon Steel Foundry vs. N.L. 
R.B., 130 Fed. 2d 404, the court held that, the 
Wagner Act requires no specific form of authority 
to bargain collectively; that authority may be 
given by action as well as in words; an application 
for union membership implies authority to bar-
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gain: not forn1 but intent, i:::; the essential thing; 
the intent is n1erelY that the union act as the 
employee's represe~tative in collective bargain-
ing; it is only ncessary that it be manifest in 
some manner capable of proof, whether by be-
havior or language: and oral authority is not 
invalid, but is merely more difficult to prove. 
Petitioners assignment of error No. 2 has no merit. 
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 
''The Board erred in determining that the 
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 
bargaining was 'all laundry production work-
ers'." 
Sub-section (c) of Section 49-1-17 reads as follows: 
"Whenever a question affecting intrastate 
commerce or the orderly operation of industry 
arises concerning the representation of employ-
ees, the board may investigate such controversy 
and certify to the parties, in writing, the name 
or names or the representatives that have been 
designated or selected . . . '' 
Sub-section (b) of ~section 49-1-17 reads as follows: 
''The board shall decide in each case whether, 
in order to insure to employees the full benefit 
of their right to self-organization and to collective 
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the poli-
cies of this act, the unit appropriate for the 
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the 
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivi-
sion thereof.'' Emphasis added.) 
Sub-section (a) of Section 49-1-17 reads as follows: 
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''Representatives designated or selected for 
the purposes of collective bargaining by the ma-
jority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining~' ... 
We quote from page 19 and 20 of Petitioner's brief, 
to-wit: 
''In making this determination within this 
general rule, the Utah Labor Relations Board 
. should consider a number of factors, the most 
important of which are: The history of collective 
bargaining and the history, extent and type of 
organization among the employees at the plant 
involved and at other plants of the same em-
ployer, or at •pJants of other employers in the 
same or related industries ; the skill, wages, and 
working conditions of the en1ployees; the desires 
of the employees; the eligibility of employees for 
membership in the union or unions involved; and 
the relationship between the unit or units pro-
posed and the operation, organization, and man-
agement of the employer's business. 
''It is the position of this respondent (?) 
that the Utah Labor Relations Board must, in 
determining the unit appropriate for purposes of 
collective bargaining consider all of the factors 
hereinabove enumerated.'' 
That would seem to us to be absolutely good law, 
and we whole heartedly concur, agree and adopt it. It 
appears that the Board very clearly followed this con-
cept. The history of the Hotel Utah Company's collective 
bargaining over a period of 10 years was gone into-the 
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extent and type of organization among the employees was 
weighed-the eligibility of the employees for membership 
in the Latmdry 'y orkers Union, the union involved, the 
working conditions, the craft set-up was all considered by 
the Board-and so following this concept, of course the 
Board did the only proper and fitting thing to do, it set up a 
craft unit. All laundry employees were on the same payroll 
and heretofore always treated as a craft unit by the Com-
pany; no other en1ployees wre on the payroll except 
laundry employees-so why mix up the garage mechanics 
and the cashiers with the laundry unit-or the bell ~oys 
and engineers with the laundry unit-perhaps the Com-
pany ·might think this a good idea in an election, because 
maybe the garage mechanics, cashiers, bell boys and 
engineers are not organized and would vote no union in 
an election. But the Board disagreed with the Company. 
The Board was thinking about the welfare of the em-
ployees in the laundry unit, who had petitioned the 
Board for a good and lawful reason. The Company was 
thinking about the welfare of the company, and that 
thinking was no union, which could be wrong even for 
the Hotel Utah Company. 
Perhaps we are too naive to recognize and assess, 
the true proportion and merit of this assignn1ent. No-
w here does there appear to be. one error by the Board 
with respect to this particular assignment. At the be-
ll ginning of the hearing on June 24th, 1948, . Commis-
sioner Daniel Edwards, stated, at page 2 of the Tran-
re script: 
~e COM. EDWARDS: The hearing will be in ses-
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sion. Laundry Workers Local No. 316, Peti-
tioner, filed a Petition for Investigation and 
Certification of representatives on June 15th, 
in which it claims bargaining right for thirty-
five production workers engaged in laundry 
work. The number and classification of em-
ployment in said unit which the Petitioner 
claims to represent consists of thirty inside 
laundry workers. 
They further request that the unit. shall in-
clude all production workers and exclude cler-
ical workers and supervisors with power to 
hire and fire. 
The Board conducted its usual investiga-
tion and served notice of hearing as of the 17th 
of June. Said notice was received by Respond-
ent and Petitioner on June 18, 1948. 
Hence it appears that the investigation of the claims 
of the union as presented in the Petition by the union 
were fully investigated by the Board, pursuant to sub-
section (c) of section 49-1-17 above mentioned, and that 
a question affecting intrastate commerce was involved, 
and that the facts set out by the union warranted a 
hearing pursuant to this particular section. There is 
only one thing the Board must do, if it investigates, the 
Boa rd must provide for a hearing and it must be ap-
propriate, and upon due notice. These three elements 
seem to he mandatory. An election is not mandatory at 
all, it is merely discretionary. If the Board decides that 
an investigation shall be made, the Board may decide 
to hold a secret election. But a secret ballot is not 
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required. The Board derides when an election is to be 
held, if any, and to illustrate the discretion of the Board, 
an election could be held before, during or after an 
investigation: an election could be held before the hear-
ing, after the hearing, or during the hearing-the dis-
cretion of the Board is that broad. In any event, sub-
section (h) of the statute was full~· complied with. The 
Board had a perfect right to decide that a craft unit 
wa~ the n1ost appropriate unit for collective bargaining 
commensurate with the welfare of the employees. The 
Company contends that they are inconvenienced by such 
a unit, but it shows no evidence to that effect because 
it can't, and this section of the Statute doesn't say any-
thing about the convenience of the employer, but it does 
say that in earh case the Board shall decide what insures 
to the employees the full benefits of their rights of self 
organization and collective bargaining. The Board com-
plied with the very letter and spirit of this section. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in N a-
tiona! Labor Relations Board vs. Hearst Publications, 
322 U. S. 111, says on page 134: 
''Wide variation in the forms of en1ployee 
self-organizations and the complexities of modern 
industrial organization make difficult the use of 
inflexible rules as the test of an appropriate unit. 
Congress was informed of the need for flexibility 
in shaping the unit to the particular case and 
accordingly gave the Board wide discretion in 
the matter. Its choice of a unit is limited speci-
fically only by the requirement that it be an 
'employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, subdivision 
thereof' and that the selection be made so a~ 'to 
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insure to employees the full benefit of their right 
to self-organization and to collective bargaining 
and otherwise to effectuate the policies of the 
Act'. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National 
Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 146, 85 L. ed 
1251, 61 S. Ct. 908. '' 
We cite the following case to the proposition; Pack-
ard Motor Car Co. vs. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485, on page 
491 the following language is found: 
''Our power to review also is circumscribed 
by the provision that findings of the Board as to 
the fact, if supported by evidence, shall be con-
clusive. 10 (e), 49 Stat. 454, c 372, 29 U.S.C.A. 
160 (e). So we have power only to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the Board, or its order over steps the law. N a-
tiona! Labor Relations Board vs. Link-Belt Co., 
311 U. S. 584, 85 L. ed. 368, 61 S. Ct. 358; Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 313 U. S. 146, 85 L. ed. 1251. 
''The issue as to what unit is appropriate for 
bargaining is one for which no absolute rule of 
law is laid down by statute, and none should be 
by decision. It involves of necessity a large mea-
sure of informed discretion and the decision of 
the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed. 
While we do not say that a determination of a 
unit of representation cannot be so unreasonable 
and arbitrary as to exceed the Board's power, 
we are clear that the decision in question does 
not do so. That settled our power is at an end." 
Nowhere is it denied that the union did not repre-
sent a majority of the Company's employees in the 
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laundy tmit. Indeed 100% of the evidence points to the 
contrary. Upon a detennination that the union repre-
sented close to 100% of the Company's employees in 
such unit, Sub-section (a) of the Statute was fully and 
c01npletely complied with. A Inere majority of the em-
ployees in such unit is the exclusive representative of 
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lectiYe bargaining. Our adversary contends, there is no 
evidence to support the Board's finding that a produc-
tion unit or Inore properly the laundry unit is appropri-
ate. Again all of the evidence points in one direction, 
exeept the evidence of -:\fr. Callister. 
:Mr. Harry F. Harter, a witness called on behalf of 
the union, testified on pages 3 and 4 of the Transcript of 
June 2-±th, 1948, as follows: 
BY ).IR. BECK: 
Q. vVha t is your business~ 
A. International organizer for the Laundry 
Workers. 
Q. \v"llere is your place of business~ 
A. 69 South State Street. 
Q. In Salt Lake City~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been identified with or-
ganized labor generally~ 
A. Since 1936. 
Q. Are you acquainted generally with the busi-
ness of the Respondent~ 
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.A. I am. 
Q. Where is it located~ 
.A. South Temple and Main. 
Q. In this city~ 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it engaged generally in the hotel business~ 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .And as a part of its business what does it 
operate over which your labor organization 
customarily takes jurisdiction~ 
.A. Laundry work, linen for the hotel. 
Q. What kind of service does that include that 
you speak of 1 
.A. Laundering linen. 
Q. .Anything else 1 
.A. That is all I know of. 
Q. Linen for what use~ 
.A. To be used in the hotel. 
Q. Bedroom and table linen~ 
.A. Yes. 
Q. .And also service to the culinary~ 
.A. Yes. . . . 
Q. Would you be good enough, Mr. Harter, to 
describe and define an employee unit appro-
priate for the purposes of bargaining with 
the Employer with respect to hours and con-
ditions of employment, particularly in a unit 
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over which your organization custmnarily 
takes jurisdiction' (Objection.) 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. ~\ll employees en1ployed by the Hotel Utah 
in the laundry department in the production 
end of it. That includes the girls and boys 
in the wash room and the shaker and mangles. 
Q. That includes the employees operating the 
manglesf 
A. Yes. 
Q. And operating the washing machines T 
A. Yes, sir, the shakers and pressers. 
Q. You are speaking now for the most part with 
respect to the laundering and finishing of 
linen for culinary service departments in the 
hotel' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vithin the plant and a part of the operations 
of the hotel~~ 
A. Yes, sir. . . . 
Q. All right then, l\1:r. Harter. So there can be 
no mistake about it, the unit that you have 
defined will be commonly known and desig-
nated as a laundry unit within the Hotel 
Utah~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And over that unit your organization takes 
jurisdiction~ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. How many employees is the laundry unit in 
the Hotel Utah composed of~ 
A. Approximately thirty-five. 
Q. Thirty five. And those are the employees 
composing such unit and are for the most 
part engaged there directly or indirectly con-
tributing-I mean engaged in laundering~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Laundering the linens for the Hotel Utah's 
use~ 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Max Carpenter, the assistant manager of the 
Hotel Utah, was called to the witness stand, not by the 
Company, but by the Board. After being duly sworn, 
he testified as follows: 
BY COM. EDWARDS: 
Q. Will you state your name, please? 
A. Max Carpenter. 
Q. You reeside at the Hotel Utah? 
A. Yes, Assistant Manager at the Hotel Utah. 
Q. How many employees are employed in the 
particular unit requesting certification by the 
Union~ 
A. I couldn't give you the exact number because 
it changes all the time. I would say about 
forty; that is an estimate, of course. 
Q. Does ·that include all of the inside laundry 
workers~ 
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A. Ye~. 
Q. "'\Vould you sa~T there are forty inside laundry 
workers? 
A. I would say that, yes. 
Q. You have seen this petition for Investigation 
and Certification have you not, Mr. Car-
penterY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There are no other type of workers involved 
or that you consider as inside laundry work-
ers in the number that you have given me at 
this time, which is forty1 
A. I don't believe I get that question, Mr. Com-
missioner. 
Q. Do you have any people that deliver from 
the laundry, or bring things to the laundry 
at the Hotel Utah that are included in the 
forty production workers that you have men-
tioned1 
A. Well, the contact, or the effect of the laundry 
for the rest of the Hotel would reach the en-
tire Hotel, because it does work for the Hotel, 
it comes in contact with the boys that bring 
down the laundry, and they take the laundry 
back to the room. In other words, there is a 
contact there although they are not on the 
laundry pay-roll. 
Q. They are not on the laUtnd.ry pay-roll, and t:he 
people you ha.ve mentioned are on the laun-
dry- pay-roll? 
A. Yes. 
COM. EDWARDS: That is all. (Emphasis ours) 
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Thus it was freely admitted by the assistant man-
ager of the Hotel Utah Company, that no employees 
except the production or laundry unit were on the Hotel 
Utah laundry payroll. Which admission is evidence 
abundant, that the craft unit found by the Board is not 
only the proper and appropriate unit, but it is the most 
convenient for the Hotel, because and by reason of the 
fact, that all of the employees comprising such unit were 
inside employees, and on one and only one particular 
payroll, to-wit: the Lawndry P.a;yroll. 
The general rule, is that if there is any substantial 
evidence whatsoever to support the Board's findings, 
then and in that event, the Courts are without power to 
set them aside. In support of the above rule, we cite 
the following cases: 
National Labor Relations Board vs. Nevada 
Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105: 
"W·e have repeatedly held that Congress, by 
providing, Section 10 (c), (e) and (f) of the N a-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Section 
1600 (c), (e) and (f) that the Board's findings 
'as to the facts if supported by evidence, shall 
be conclusive,' precludes the courts from weigh-
ing evidence in reviewing the Board's orders, and 
if the findings of the Board are supported by 
evidence the courts are not free to set them aside 
even though the Board could have drawn different 
inferences.'' 
American Foundry & l\fachine Company vs. 
Utah Labor Relations Board, 105 Utah 83, 141 
Pac. 2d 390: 
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''The only question heforP this Court is 
whether on the record as it now stands, these find-
ings are supported by substantial evidence. It 
is not a question of weighing the evidence, and 
determining what decision we would have arrived 
at had we been n1e1nbers of the board. Tt is well 
established that if the award or finding is sup-
ported by substantial evidence, then it must be 
sustained by this Court on review. Our own Court 
has passed on this question in Buildings Service 
Employees vs. X ewhouse Realty Co., et al, 97 
Utah 562, 95 P. 2d 507.'' 
See Packard :Jfotor Car Co. vs. National La-
bor Relations Board, supra. 
Xational Labor Relations Board vs. Lettie 
Lee, Inc., 140 Fed. 2d 2-t-3 ( CCa 9) 1944. 
"The choice of an appropriate unit for col-
lective bargaining is one for the official judgment 
of the Board and unless the decision of the Board 
as to the appropriate unit passes the bounds of 
permissive discretion of the administrative body 
in the particular case, the Court c.annot interfere 
in such matters.'' 
Hence it would seem speeious and hollow for our 
adversary to contend that it~ convenience is interfered 
with by the selection of a craft unit or that the Board 
acted arbitrarily and was motivated by some capricious 
whim. The Board was not groping in a factual vacuum 
in this case. The Board went through its usual investiga-
tion before the hearing. The Board then heard the testi-
mony of ~Ir. Harter describing the unit. The Board then 
heard Mr. Carpenter testify, that the laundry unit and 
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payroll was a distinct and segregated craft set up within 
the general hotel operation. The Board examined the ex-
hibits in this case. 
There is no merit to Petitioner's assignment No. 3. 
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNr.JENT OF ERROR NO.4 
"The Utah Labor Relations Board erred in 
providing in its order that Hotel Utah Company 
cease and desist from any further unfair labor 
practices as set forth in Section 49-1-16, Sub-
section 1, Paragraph d, Utah Code Annotated 
1943 as amended.'' 
The rather doubtful point here raised by our op-
ponent, seems to be, that the Board should have used 
the word" such" instead of the word "any" at the end 
of line one of paragraph 1 of the order of the Board. 
We fail to see n1uch substance in such super technical 
argument. The only case that was before the Board 
was this case and the only unfair labnr practices that 
were before the Board were the unfair labor practices 
charged in the complaint in this case; so quite naturally 
the Board ordered the Hotel Utah Company to bargain, 
because they refused to bargain, in defiance of the Board. 
The Board used the words ''any further unfair labor 
practices." It plainly meant what everyone knows, to-
wit: The unfair labor practices set out in the complaint 
which were admitted by the Company. 
That the Board could have improved the language 
it used in the order· we admit, but it is silly to argue 
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that the Board had other cases in mind. rrhe point is 
trifling. 
In support of the power of the Board to issue such 
an order we cite the following case: 
National Labor Relations Board vs. Cheney 
Cal. Lumber Co .. 327 U. S. 385: 
•' The court below struck out frorn the 
Board's order paragraph 1 (b) "'hereby the Com-
pany \Yas ordered, after appropriate treatment 
of the unfair labnr practice arising from prohibited 
discharge of employees to cease and desist from 
'(b) In any other manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of 
the Act'. 
"The Court found warrant for its excision 
of this provision in National Labor Relations 
Board vs. Express Pub. Co., 312 U. S. 426, 85 L. 
ed. 930, 61 S. Ct. 693, supra. That case, however, 
recognized that it was withtin the power of the 
Board to make an order precisely like 1 (b). It 
merely held that whether such an inclusive provi-
sion as 1 (b) is justified in a particular case 
depends upon the circumstances of the particular 
case before the Board. See 312 U.S. at 433, 437, 
438. Here the trial examiner recommended the 
inclusion of 1 (b) on the basis of his review of 
past hostilities by the company against efforts at 
unionization ; no exception was made either to 
the findings or this recommendation; upon full 
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consideration of the record the Board adopted 
the trial examiner's recommendation; no objec-
tion was raised by the Company until after the 
Board sought judicial enforcement of this order. 
The objection comes too late." ... 
On page 389 of 327 U. S.: "Justification of 
such an order, which necessarily involves con-
sideration of the facts which are the foundation 
of the order, is not open for review by a court if 
no prior objection has been urged before the case 
gets into court and there is a total want of extra-
ordinary circumstances to excuse 'the failure or 
neglect to urge such objection'. Congress desired 
that all controversies of fact, and the allowable 
inferences from the facts, be thrashed out, cer-
tainly in the first instance, before the Board. It 
was therefore not within the power of the court 
below to make the deletion it made.'' 
We see no merit in Petitioner's Assignment No.4. 
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5 
''The Utah Labor Relations Board did not 
have the authority to issue any order or make 
any findings. ' ' 
In this behalf we invite the court's attention to the 
paragraph on page 32 of Petitioner's brief, to-wit: 
''Nor is there any allegation that any person 
or particularly the Hotel Utah, is engaging in 
any unfair labor practice affecting intrastate 
commerce of the orderly operation of industry." 
The mere fact that it is admitted the Hotel Utah 
Company is in business in Salt Lake City, Utah; that 
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it operates a laundry: and that about 30 of :-;neh laundry 
employees have asked the Utah Labor Relations Board 
to certify the union as their collective bargaining agent; 
that the Board took jurisdirtion and certified the union, 
in writing, as the collertiYe bargaining agent for all the 
employees in Petitioner's laundry unit; that the Board 
found the Company guilty of unfair labor practices-
would seem abundantly clear that state romrnerce was 
affected. 
Assume the N" ational Labor Relations Board has 
concurrent jurisdiction or even exclusive jurisdiction in 
the premises. That is a defense for the Company to 
raise-and maybe they don't want it raised; maybe they 
are happy the National Labor Relations Board does not 
have jurisdiction, if it does not have. At any rate the 
Company admits it is in business in Utah, and if they 
are guilty of violating the Board's express order, and 
the Company admits that it is guilty of such violation-
then and in that event, it is perfectly obvious, that such 
violation affects intrastate commerce-and a fortiori, 
Interstate Commerce would also be affected if such 
commerce is involved here. Whatever the consequence, 
Petitioner's last mentioned statement just does not 
square with the law or the facts. We submit an illustra-
tion, and quote from the opening paragraph and para-
graphs 1, 2 and 7 of the charge: 
"Comes now the petitioner and pursuant to 
Title 49-1 Utah Code annotated 1943, as arnended 
1947, and the rules and regulation of Utah Labor 
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Relations Board, does hereby charge as follows, 
to-wit: 
I. 
''That respondent who's address is South 
Temple and Main streets in Salt Lake City and 
County, State of Utah, is engaged in a general 
hotel business in said city, and as such has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices 
pursuant to said title and especially paragraphs 
d, c, b and a, of Section 49-1-16 thereof and Sec-
tion 49-1-15 thereof. 
II. 
"That petitioner is an affiliate of American 
Federation of Labor, that petitioner's address is 
59 South State Street in said city. That petitioner 
is now, and ever since the 5th day of August, 1948, 
has been the duly authorized collective bargaining 
representatives of a majority of respondents em-
ployees in a collctive bargaining unit appropriate 
for the purposes of collective bargaining on be-
half of such employees respecting hours, wages, 
and conditions of employment. 
VII. 
''That such wnfair labor practices on the part 
of respondent are unfair labor practices affecting 
intras:t!a,te commerce ·and the orderly operation of 
industry within the meaning of said .act." 
We quote paragraph 1 and 2 of the Board's com-
plaint: 
"1. That the Hotel Utah Company, here-
inafter referred to as Respondent, is a corpora-
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tion organized under the laws of the State of 
Utah and as such is doing !Jusiness in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
· · ~. That Re~pondent is an en1ployer within 
the n1eaning of Title -HLl-10, Sub-section (2)." 
\Y e quote paragraphs 1, 6, 8 and 9 of the Board's 
findings of faet: 
''1. That Hotel Utah Con1pany, hereinafter 
referred to as respondent, is a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of the State of Utah and 
as such is doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"6. That the Utah Labor Relations Board 
certified the Petitioner as the legally selected and 
designated agent of the employees of eRspond-
ent in the above described unit for the purposes 
of collective bargaining on August 5, 1948. 
"8. That Respondent did refuse to bargain 
with Complainant on the grounds: (a) That the 
unit found by the Board was not an appropriate 
unit. (b) That the Board's method of determin-
ing the Collective Bargaining Representative, if 
any, was not in conformity with the Utah Labor 
Relations Act. 
"9. That Respondent did refuse to bar-
gain.'' 
We quote paragraph 1 of the Company's Answer 
to the Board's Complaint. 
'' 1. Adm~t's the allegations contained, m 
paragraphs 1 and 2.'' 
Obviously, it was alleged, admitted, proved and 
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found that the Hotel Utah Company was in intrastate 
business in Utah. That it was guilty of certain unfair 
labor practices, manifestly that could not be so unless 
its business was affected, at least to some extent-good, 
bad, or indifferent in ·such a labor controversy. 
Teamsters Local Union No. 222 and the In-
dustrial Commission vs. Strevell-Paterson Hard-
ware Co., 17 4 Pac. 2d 164, 1948: 
''As we read the case the jurisdiction of the 
Board in each particular case does not depend 
upon a finding by it to the effect that the act. or 
acts complained of affect interstate commerce, but 
whether in fact the act or acts complained of 
actually do or may reasonably affect the free flow 
of interstate commerce. In the instant case de-
fendant admitted it was engaged in intrastate 
commerce. That being so, the Board had juris-
diction to hear the matter and make the order 
complained of if there was sufficient evidence of 
acts of defendant which would affect intrastate 
commerce . . . '' 
Petitioner's assignment of error No. 5 has no merit. 
IN CONCLUSION WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT 
I. 
That the Board's findings of fact were more de-
tailed, full and comprehensive than the Statute requires. 
That such findings were concurred in and agreed to 
unanimously by the Board. 
II. 
That the method of selecting a collective bargaining 
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agent i~ ~trirtly within the di~eretion of the Board-
that all of the eYidence introduced supports the Board's 
procedure in fixing the collective bargaining agent; that 
the evidence wa~ far n1ore than ample and sufficient. 
III. 
That Section -!9-1-17 Sub-section (b) Utah Code 
Annotated provides that the Board shaH decide in each 
ease. respecting the welfare of the employees; the insur-
ance of self-organization and collective bargaining in 
behalf of e1nployees. That the Board shall decide in the 
interest of the employees, commensurate with effectuat-
ing the policies of the Act, whether the collective bar-
gaining unit shall be a craft, plant, employer, or a com-
bination sub-division unit. 
The selection of a collective bargaining unit entirely 
rests ·within the discretion of the Board. The Board 
decided that the unit most suitable to serve the best 
interest of all parties should be a craft unit-indeed the 
Board could not very well have decided otherwise, unless 
there occurred some reason to ignore the evidence, for 
the reason, that the evidence and all the evidence and all 
the witnesses (excepting Mr. Callister) support the selec-
tion of a craft bargaining unit; moreover a craft unit was 
the unit desired by these employees. 
IV. 
That the order of the Board must be construed in 
accordance with the facts in this case. The portion there-
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of which orders the Company to ''cease and desist from 
any further unfair labor practices'' must necessarily 
apply only to those practices under consideration by the 
Board in the instant case. We submit that to substitute 
the word "such" for "any" would effectuate no sub-
stantive change in the order. 
v. 
The Union alleged and the Company admitted, com-
merce as contemplated in the Act. 
We respectfully pray the Court to enter its decree 
to the end that the order of the Utah Labor Relations 
Board herein be forthwith enforced. 
All of which we respectfully submit. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney Gener>al 
MARK K. BOYLE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Utlah Laboff Relations Board 
CLARENCE M. BECK, 
REID W. NIELSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Laundry Workers Local 
Union No. 316. 
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